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ABSTRACT 
This  study reports the results of an  experiment to  investigate the value of increased 
cost report accuracy in competitive pricing decisions. Prior work has  shown that in 
more  competitive  environments,  cost  system  choice  matters  less  since  there  is 
opportunity to  learn  from  infonnative market  signals.  Our  study  argues  that  in  a 
dynamic  duopoly,  learning from such infonnative market signals is  distorted when 
decision makers act as  market leaders deciding first on prices.  Compared to  second 
movers  (followers),  a leader with  a biased cost report  continues  to  prefer his  own 
distorted  cost figures  over the informative  signals  emanating from  better informed 
market  players.  Consequently  he  realizes  lower  performance  and  can  be  taken 
advantage  of by opponents with access  to  superior cost data.  We  conclude  that in 
order to  achieve profit leadership,  current reputational market  leaders  have  a  great 
interest in improving the accuracy of  their own cost report system. 
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This study reports experimental evidence on the benefits of  more accurate cost reports 
for pricing decisions in a competitive market environment. Regarding this matter 
there exists a large discrepancy between the practitioner and academic research 
literature. The practitioner-oriented literature generally argues that firms benefit more 
from accurate cost systems when the market becomes more competitive (Cooper, 
1988; Cooper and Kaplan, 1998; Hanson, 1998). Competitive settings amplify the 
need for improved pricing, which should motivate investments in cost system 
refinement. Cooper and Kaplan (1998), for instance, argued that activity based costing 
(ABC) provides a firm with significant advantages for price setting, especially when 
their competition continues to follow signals from less refined cost systems, which 
makes them vulnerable to targeted actions by competitors having access to superior 
costing data. 
Both theoretical and experimental contributions in the academic literature have raised 
doubt about the generalization of  these claims. It  is argued that cost system choice 
does not matter in markets with several competing players making price offers, since 
firms can learn from the actions of  superior players (Waller, Shapiro and Sevcik, 
1999). Vives (1990) has shown mathematically that for price setting, a less informed 
competitor can benefit from the firm who has access to more accurate data.  Briers, 
Chow, Hwang, and Luckett (1999) demonstrated empirically that decision makers' 
pricing decisions rapidly improve over time by incorporating informative market 
signals, even if  they receive biased cost data. Although none of  these studies directly 
considered ABC, one could argue that decision makers in a competitive setting would 
always base their decisions on better information in the market -when it is available-
which would make any exercise in cost system refinement redundant.  In addition, 
since a firm with inferior cost data seems to learn from the price choices of  a superior 
rival, it is for the latter difficult to gain the advantage suggested by the managerial 
literature (Cooper and Kaplan, 1998). 
We will contribute to this debate by testing whether highly informative market 
feedback is always used in the decision process. If  such market signals would be 
underutilized, more accurate ABC information would continue to facilitate profit 
2 improvement. Secondly, if  even decision makers with inferior cost data would 
underutilize informative market signals, they would continue to be vulnerable to the 
actions of  rivals using superior cost information. 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
A long line of  research has investigated the value of  different accounting systems for 
pricing and output decisions when firms act individually as monopolists (Ashton, 
1976; Briers, Luckett and Chow, 1997; Gupta and King, 1997, Hilton, Swieringa and 
Turner, 1988; etc.). The well-accepted main conclusion is that decision makers tend to 
fixate their decisions on the output of  the cost system (Ashton, 1976). Even when 
diagnostic outcome feedback is available, subjects tend to anchor on accounting 
figures for subsequent adjustments in the decision process (Briers et aI., 1997; Gupta 
& King, 1997). Apparently, providing subjects with simple outcome feedback is not 
enough to reduce their reliance on cost figures. In such scenario's increased cost 
accuracy will lead to improved pricing policies (Briers et aI., 1997). 
In a more competitive context, decision makers receive additional feedback from 
other market players' actions. Most of  the relevant research suggests that competitors 
are able to learn from the feedback they receive out of  the market (Briers et a11999; 
Bruns and McKinnon, 1993; Vives 1990; Waller, 1995; Waller et ai.  1999).  A priori 
it is unclear to us why competitors would always let the most diagnostic information 
guide their decisions, if  monopolists are not.  We offer a two-fold theoretical rationale 
for our skepticism. 
Our first argument is based on the well-known cognitive limitations to learning in 
complex environments.  Competitive 'games' are dynamic.  They extend over 
multiple periods and take place in information rich environments.  Period-by-period 
profit feedback and potentially diagnostic market and cost system signals are mixed 
with irrelevant information (Bloomfield, Libby and Nelson, 1999; Cooper, 1996; Roth 
and Erev, 1995). Bounded rationality puts limits on the ability of  the decision maker 
to filter in and weigh the relevant information, and to filter out the irrelevant 
(Coughlan and Mantrala, 1992), and will interfere with learning from experience 
3 (Brehmer 1984; Cardinaels, Roodhooft and Warlop 2002). Appropriately factoring in 
diagnostic market feedback will therefore be difficult. 
While the complexity will increase as the number of  relevant competitors increases, 
we perform a strong test by assuming a duopoly in which only one other player is the 
source of  potentially relevant market signals. We perform a direct test of  whether less-
informed decision makers with biased cost data can learn from better-informed rivals 
with access to more accurate cost data when they play against each other in an 
interactive price setting task over multiple periods.  In fact, we will compare an 
asymmetric information scenario - in which one player receives an ABC report while 
the other player received a traditional volume based cost report - with symmetric 
scenarios in which both parties receive either ABC or volume based cost reports.  It 
is important to note that neither participant in our study knows which cost information 
the other party can rely on.  They will have to learn through experience whether the 
pricing behavior of  the other party constitutes a valid signal for their own decisions. 
Our second argument refers to the emotional correlates of rmding on~self  in either the 
leader or the follower position. We argue that participants in a leader role are less 
sensitive to relevant external market signals. Underutilization of  external signals from 
competitors has been documented in experimental economics by Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999), who labeled it as 'reference group neglect'. They showed that in some 
circumstances decision makers in an interactive game with competing rivals exhibit a 
bias that leads them to disregard their competition.  In their study participants were 
more likely to neglect their competing rivals in market entry decisions, when they had 
voluntarily signed up for a task stating that their performance would largely depend 
on their own skills. The underutilization of  competitor data resulted into excess entry 
with inferior decision performance (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). 
In contrast with Camerer and Lovallo (1999) we do not induce our competitors to 
concentrate on their own skills by formerly stating that performance would depend on 
own actions. Rather, we suspect that the role assigned in an adaptive play duopoly 
spontaneously guides attention to either internal or external market information.  In 
our experiment, we inform both players that historically they have either been 
'barometric' leaders, or followers.  Characteristics of  barometric leadership are that 
4 the leading firm responds more quickly to market conditions than its rivals, and that it 
serves as a barometer for current market conditions for other firms without having in 
itself significant market power or.a cost advantage (Cooper, 1996; Scherer, 1980). 
Participants who are assigned such a leadership role in our experiment may 
spontaneously assume that their performance largely depends on their own skills as a 
leader, and they may be more inclined to neglect competitor feedback (are more prone 
to reference group neglect).  Followers, on the other hand, might be more inclined to 
scan the competitive environment as they are looking for solutions to improve their 
competitive position. 
Because of  this tendency to ignore feedback of  other market players, we expect 
leaders to resort to their own cost system just like monopolists would do (Ashton, 
1976; Briers et al. 1997, Gupta and King, 1997). This will provide an advantage to 
those leaders who receive more accurate costing data (Gupta and King, 1997). But if 
their own system produces biased cost information we expect that the leaders' 
performance will generally be lower, even ifthere is an opportunity to learn from a 
competitor with access to more accurate cost data. We predict that the rational 
argument that less informed participants benefit from better informed rivals (Vives, 
1990) will hold for followers but not for leaders in a duopoly.  Formally, we can state 
the following hypothesis: 
HI:  Since leaders are more likely to neglect competitor data, they only 
improve performance when their own cost report provides more accurate 
cost information 
For followers the relationship between their own cost information and competitor data 
is different. Followers do not exhibit this tendency to ignore competitor feedback. 
Similar to arguments made by Briers et al. (1999) and Waller et al. (1999), we 
therefore argue that the follower's own cost information is made redundant when there 
is an opportunity to learn from better-informed leaders. If followers receive biased 
cost data they can improve performance by imitating the price choices of a competitor 
who has access to accurate cost data. Although followers might also be influenced by 
less relevant competitor feedback (Iselin, 1996), we expect more accurate cost data to 
provide an advantage since they allow decision makers to weigh the price choices of  a 
5 less infonned competitor against the own accounting data (Cardinaels, Roodhooft and 
Warlop, 2002). The more accurate these data, the sooner the follower will realize that 
price choices ofa less infonned competitor are not a valid source ofinfonnation. We 
therefore predict an interaction between the followers' own cost data and their 
competitor feedback, such that the followers' accounting feedback will be redundant 
when their leaders receive more accurate cost data but not when the rivals are less 
infonned about cost: 
H2:  The follower's own cost accounting system is made redundant only when 
the competitor has access to more accurate cost data 
We also consider the profit perfonnance of  followers compared to that of  leaders in 
the experiment. Theoretical work of  Gal-Or (1985) shows that when competitors are 
rational and perfectly infonned, second movers are able to earn higher profits 
compared to their first mover counterparts when they compete on prices. However in 
an adaptive play scenario where players with different cost infonnation compete 
against each other, this relation might be different. Experimental work in accounting 
(Bloomfield, Libby and Nelson, 1999) shows that investors are outperfonned by other 
investors when they have an infonnational disadvantage, especially one of  which they 
are not aware. Our third research question therefore mainly focuses on duopolies 
where one party has less accurate cost infonnation compared to the other party. 
Because we assumed that leaders are more likely to ignore competitor feedback 
(Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) we can argue that leaders are less aware of  a cost 
disadvantage when their follower receives more accurate cost data. Following the 
arguments of  Bloomfield et ai. (1999) a better-infonned follower should outperfonn a 
less-infonned leader. Leaders with more accurate cost data, on the other hand, are less 
able to outperfonn followers with less accurate costs, since followers reduce or 
eliminate their cost disadvantage by taking into account the actions of  a better-
infonned leader (Waller et ai., 1999). 
H3:  In a duopoly where one party has access to more accurate cost data, only 
better informed followers (but not better informed leaders) are able to 
outperform their less-informed rivals 
6 In general these hypotheses predict that learning from accounting data and competitor 
feedback is less effective for leaders. Leaders first of  all do not learn from better-
informed competitors when their own system provides inaccurate cost data, while 
followers do. Secondly, less informed leaders are also outperformed by better 
informed followers due to the fact that one as a leader is less aware of  possible cost 
information disadvantages. 
3. Experimental design 
3.1. Experimental market environment 
Participants play against each other in two market segments denoted by A and B. 
Each market segment is characterized by a Von Stackelberg price setting duopoly in 
which one firm (firm i) acts as a first mover while the other firm (firmj) acts second. 
A typical demand function for differentiated products -e.g. products differing in their 
brand names - was defined for each market segment (Callahan and Gabriel, 1998): 
s=A,B  (1) 
where Qis is the quantity demanded by the first mover in market segment s, and Pis 
and Pjs are the price charged by respectively the first and the second mover in market 
segment s. Parameter Us (>0) represents the demand at zero prices. Parameters vs is set 
higher than ws (vs > ws; vs, ws > 0) in order to make the firm's own price effect more 
dominant than the competitor's cross-price demand effect. These parameters are 
displayed in table 1. 
The actual cost function for each firm is defined as a second degree of output and is 
given by formula (2). Both the first and the second mover face the same cost function. 
It is important to note that parameters are chosen in such a way that the market 
segments are highly heterogeneous in the costs they incur. Table 1 shows that market 
A is a high cost-to-serve market because it has a much higher fixed cost (parameter f) 
and because cost increase with larger amounts as output increases (parameters yen z). 
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The subject's task was to maximize profits by differentiating prices across the two 
market segments given the price choices of  the other firm. In fact the profit function 
of  each firm can be written in terms of  the decision variable price: 
Since our primary focus is on cost, parameters were set such that in order to increase 
profits, market A required much higher prices then market B, because A was 
compared to B more costly. Because we want to investigate how different levels of 
cost accuracy affect pricing decisions, the participants were not given the actual cost 
but received imperfect cost reports in which we manipulated the degree of  cost 
(in)accuracy. Besides cost information, subjects were also informed of  the price 
choices of  their competitor and his realized profit. Since both firms face similar 
market conditions, this source of  feedback can also be used in the price setting 
process (Frederickson, 1992). 
In each period of  the game the following sequence of  events took place. All subjects 
received an initial imperfect cost report and a report showing the price choices oftheir 
competitor and his realized profit in the previous period.  Starting prices for the first 
period were set by the experimenter.  In the first stage the leader (firm i) chose prices 
for market A and B. In the following stage, the second mover (firmj) was able to 
observe the price choices of  the first mover, after which he determined his own price 
choices for market A and B. In the final stage, both markets cleared and firms 
received outcome feedback, an updated imperfect cost report and an updated report on 
the price choices of  the competitor and his total profit. This cycle of  events was 
repeated over 10 trials. 
8 3.2. Experimental factors 
The experiment was run as a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design. The first factor was 
the 'role' subjects played in the duopoly. They were assigned either the role of  first 
mover (leader) or the role of  second mover (follower). In order to induce barometric 
price leadership (Scherer, 1980), the first mover was described to both players as a 
firm which sets prices first due to fact that it has built up a strong reputation and brand 
name in the past. The second mover was described as a firm that recognizes this 
leadership and therefore moves second after the first mover has announced his price 
choice. 
The second factor was the 'own cost information'. After the new price choices were 
determined, participants were issued an imperfect cost report as shown in appendix A. 
Subjects either received a traditional cost report or a more accurate ABC report. In the 
traditional cost report, typical marketing costs were assigned to each market segment 
using sales volume as a driver. This driver was unable to capture the differences in 
actual cost to serve each market segment (Selnes, 1992), resulting in a highly biased 
cost picture at the market segment level (see appendix A). In an ABC report 
marketing costs were assigned using a two-step procedure (Kaplan and Atkinson, 
1998). In the first step marketing costs were assigned to three marketing activities. In 
the second stage, ABC allocated the cost of  each activity across market segments 
using their respective activity drivers (number of  orders, software licenses, and 
deliveries). Market A required a lot more of  these activity drivers compared to market 
B, rendering it per unit more costly to serve. Appendix A shows that ABC revealed 
unit cost figures that were a fairly close approximation of  actual cost-to-serve 
differences among market segments  1. 
'Competitor feedback' was manipulated as a third factor. Since subjects played 
against each other, each participant in the experiment could either receive feedback 
from a competitor having access to more accurate cost information (ABC), or a 
competitor using traditional cost reports. Neither participant did in fact know which 
cost system their opponent received, and they were not made aware that differences in 
1 ABC is still an imperfect cost report (Christensen and Demski, 1995) since costs are assigned using 
drivers that are linear with respect to output (appendix A), while the actual cost function is non-linear. 
9 the cost report systems might have existed. After each decision they only received the 
competitor's price choices for market A and B and his corresponding realized overall 
profit. 
The design created four types of experimental duopolies that each had a different 
information structure (see table 2; with the number of  participants in each cell 
between brackets). The duopolies of  type 1 and type 4 had a symmetric information 
structure since both first mover (leader) and second mover (follower) received either a 
traditional cost report (TRAD) or a more accurate activity based costing report 
(ABC). The duopolies of  type 2 and 3 are characterized by an asymmetric information 
structure since either only the follower, or only the leader had access to the more 
accurate cost information. 
Table 2: the four different types of duopolies and their information structure 
First Mover (leader) 














Participants were recruited from management accounting courses at a large West-
European university. They were all graduate students - on average 23 years old - with 
a university degree, completing Master programs in Accountancy, Insurance, Applied 
Economics or Industrial Management. The accounting courses had dealt with ABM 
issues such as applying ABC for customer profitability analysis and price 
differentiation among customers and market segments. A total of 116 students -were 
randomly assigned to one of  the eight experimental cells.  They completed the task on 
a computer. Each session lasted about 1,5 hours. To induce motivation, subjects were 
notified in advance that the best eight players - with the highest profit realized over all 
trials - would receive a 20 € gift coupon2 exchangeable against books or CD's. 
2 In reality we rewarded the best player in each of the six experimental cells with a coupon. Average 
profit was taken as  a reward,  in order to restrict people from taking risky decisions for one of the 
trials. McIntyre & Ryans (1983) use a similar compensation scheme. 
10 Before starting the experimental task, participants saw information concerning the 
target company and their task on the computer screen. The target company was 
described as an importer of  portable computers of  a particular brand, which 
distributed its pes in two market segments. In order to induce prior cost knowledge, 
participants were explicitly told that both markets had different cost structures due to 
the fact that customers in market A were more demanding with respect to orders, 
deliveries and software requirements. Subjects were told that they would play against 
a competing distributor of a different brand, operating in the same two markets and 
facing similar cost structures. The firm that moved first (leader) was described as a 
leading distributor of pes with a strong brand name and reputation. The second mover 
was described as a firm that recognized this leadership and only acted when the leader 
had announced his price choices. 
Subjects were instructed to maximize profits by determining new selling prices for 
pes within each market segment. The task was performed over ten periods. A price 
brackee between €1200 and € 2100 was established. To provide ample opportunity to 
improve, the starting prices were set such that they were not in line with the cost-of-
serving (the price for market A was lower price than for market B while market A was 
in fact more costly/. After each period, an updated cost report and a report on the 
competitor's price choices and realized profits were issued to the participants. 
Throughout the experiment the subject's price choices and total profits for the last 
five trials, together with those of  the competitor, remained on the screen. After the last 
trial, the task automatically finished. An exit questionnaire assessed the subjects' task 
motivations. They were all highly motivated (average: 4.29 on a 5-point scale) and, 
importantly, no motivational differences were detected with respect to the role 
(F(!,108): 0.16; p>.68) the own cost information (F(l,108): 2.02; p>.15) or the 
competitor's cost information (F(l,I08): 0.18; p>.67), nor with respect to any of the 
interactions among these factors (all p's > .16). 
3 This was done in order to ensure that quantities demanded remained positive at all times, given the 
competitor's price choice. 
4 In each duopoly the first mover initial price choices were PA= 1650 and PB = 1710 while for the 
second mover the starting prices were PA = 1645 and PB = 1706. 
5 The exit questionnaire also assessed the subjects' SUbjective experience of  sensitivity to the behavior 
of  the other player.  These results are discussed below. 
11 4. Results 
4.1. The effect on individual performance 
In this section, we analyze how the participants learned to improve their decisions 
based on the different kinds of  feedback they received. Participants could have based 
their decisions on their own costing system (either ABC or TRAD). On the other 
hand, they might have considered the price choices and the realized performance of 
their competitor, who in tum used a particular cost report (ABC or TRAD). Therefore 
we consider the factors 'own costing system' (OS), 'competitor feedback' (CF), and 
their interaction as potential explanatory variables for decision performance. In 
addition, participants were expected to improve performance as they gained 
experience in the task (Gupta & King, 1997). Hence, cumulative experience -reflected 
by the trial number T - was included as a control variable. Since we expected 
differential effects of  these feedback conditions according the role participants 
performed in the duopoly, the influence on decision performance was analyzed 
separately for leaders and followers in the experiment. 
Several metrics of decision performance were tested. We first tested a model with the 
total realized profit score (absolute profit) as a dependent variable. Secondly, for each 
trial we checked how close participants were to the optimal performance level, given 
the price choices of  their opponent. Besides the percentage deviation from optimal 
profit (%dev.profit) we also considered the deviation from optimal price levels 
(%dev.price)6 as a possible dependent variable. 
Three regression models were tested for leaders (role=O) and followers (role=l) 
separately. Because of  evidence of  higher order serial correlation, parameters of  the 
models were estimated using the Yule-Walker method that corrects for serial order 
correlation in the data. Table 3 displays the summary statistics while Table 4 shows 
the corresponding regression results for the different roles: 
6  For each trial t and each participant i we derived the  optimal profit and price levels that could he 
achieved  given  the  other  participants  (competitor)  price  choice  for  that  trial;  %dev.profit  = 
(1tit*-1tiJ/1tit*  where 1tit*  the optimal profit and 1tit the  profit actually realized by the participant i in 
trial  t;  %dev.price  =  (Pai/-PlIjJlPait + (Phit*-PhiJlPhit  where  Pait*  and  phit* the  optimal  price  in 
market A and Band Pait and Phit the actual prices charged in hoth markets for participant i in trial t. 
12 Modell:  Absolute profitit 
Model 2:  % dev.profitit 
Model 3:  % dev.priceit 
= bO + biOS + b2 CF + b3 OS*CF + b4 T 
= bO + biOS + b2 CF + b3 OS*CF + b4 T 
= bO + biOS + b2 CF + b3 OS*CF + b4 T 
with absolute profiti" % dev.profititand % dev.pricei" the metrics for decision 
performance for each participant i in trial t; with OS the own cost system (OS=1  for 
ABC, 0 otherwise); with CF the competitor feedback (CF=1  if the competitor uses 
ABC, 0 otherwise); T = trial 1, 2, ... , 10. 
Table 3: Average statistics over the ten trials for each test metrica 
Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  Type 4 
L:TRAD  L:TRAD  L:ABC  L:ABC 
[F: TRAD]  [F: ABC]  [F: TRAD]  [F: ABC] 
Absolute profit  556751  570875  647018  623186 
[533192]  [620027]  [649401]  [655129] 
%dev.profit  30.41%  27.43%  18.94%  18.09% 
[33.37%]  [22.31 %]  [20.01 %]  [16.83%] 
%dev.price  29.57%  27.64%  21.72%  18.13% 
[30.35%]  [23.25%]  [22.34%]  [17.10%] 
trial/subject obs.(n)  140  140  150  150 
[140]  [140]  [150]  [150] 
a Cells contain the means for the leader, [means for the follower], over the 10 trials 
In panel A of  table 4 one can observe the regression results for the participants acting 
as leaders. Since trial T was significant in all models we can conclude that leaders 
improved as experience is gained in the task (Gupta and King, 1997). More 
interesting are the effects for the different feedback conditions. In all three models 
only the participant's own cost system (OS) was significant. This indicates that cost 
accuracy was always important for the leader, irrespective of  the feedback received 
from the other market player. As predicted in HI, leaders had a tendency to base their 
decisions on their own cost system. When comparing the means in Table 3 for 
participants in the leadership role, one can observe that leaders mainly improved 
when they themselves have ABC. Contrary to the findings in other studies (Briers et 
aI., 1999; Vives, 1990; Waller et aI.  1999) they learned little from a better informed 
competitor with superior performance when they receive more biased cost data 
(compare type 2 with type 1). 
13 Table 4: regression results for the three different models (using Yule-Walker method) 
Panel A: Parameter estimates and significance levels for the 'leader' role 
on the three dependent variables 
DeQendent variables 
Estimate  absolute profits  %dev.profit  %dev.price 
508239  •• ,  0.3735'"  0.3433 ... 
Intercept  ... 
-0.1143'"  .. , 
Own system (OS)  91532  -0.0782 
Competitor feedback (CF)  9815  -0.0302  -0.0180 
OS*CF  -34442  0.0164  -0.0238 
TRIAL(T)  8925'"  -0.0123'"  -0.0083'" 
".  0.4013'"  0.6073 
,  .. 
R-square  0.3873 
Panel B: Parameter estimates and significance levels for the 'follower' role 
on the three dependent variables 
DeQendent variables 
Estimate  absolute profits  %dev.profit  %dev.price 
Intercept  478034  .**  0.4067'"  0.3580 ." 
Own system (OS)  95491 
,., 
-0.1238'"  -0.0846*** 
Competitor feedback (CF)  112670 .,'  -0.1295'"  -0.0784'" 
OS*CF  -86340"  0.0850"  0.0303 
TRIAL(T)  9835'**  -0.0127'"  -0.0092'" 
R-square  0.4968'"  0.4694'"  0.6414'" 
Significance: *  p<.lO level; ** p <.05 level; *** p < .01  level 
Panel B of  Table 4 displays the results for the follower's role. As did the leaders, 
followers increased their performance over time, since trial (T) is significant in each 
model. The main effects ofthe own cost system (OS) and competitor feedback (CF), 
and their interaction, are all significant in the models with absolute profit and the 
deviation against optimal profit as dependent variables. The significant interaction 
term indicates that the follower's own cost system became redundant when feedback 
was received from a competitor using accurate cost data but not when this competitor 
used biased cost data. This finding supports our H2. When comparing the means for 
both profit metrics, Table 3 reveals that followers were able to learn from their better-
informed leaders when they received biased cost data (type 3). They actually 
performed as good as if  they would had received ABC (type 4). However, when the 
competitor received inferior cost data, cost system choice matters.  These followers 
improved when more accurate cost data was provided (compare type 1 vs. type 2). 
14 For the model with deviation from optimal prices we did not find a significant 
interaction term between the feedback conditions. Apparently, the value of  ABC for 
price setting is not completely redundant when there is an opportunity to learn from 
price choices of  better-informed rivals. However, this observed price effect did not 
result into significant profit effects. 
4.2. The effect on relative performance 
In this section we report analyses on two metrics assessing the relative performance of 
each player compared to his opponent. Besides the difference in absolute profits 
between followers and their leaders, we also report the total market share7 of  the 
follower. When the difference in absolute profits is different from zero or the 
follower's market share is different from 50%, we can argue that one player was able 
to outperform the other. 
In Panel A of table 5 these metrics are reported for each duopoly type. We first 
compare settings in which one party has access to more accurate cost data, while the 
other party has not (Type 2 and 3 duopolies). In a type 2 duopoly, one can observe 
that not only the difference in profits between a follower and a leader is significantly 
higher than zero, but that also the follower's market share is significantly higher than 
50%. Followers with more accurate costing data than their leaders, did outperform 
those leaders.  On the other hand, when leaders had a costing system advantage (a 
type 3 duopoly), they were not able to outperform their less-informed rivals.  The 
profit difference was not different from zero, nor did the market share differ from a 
fifty-fifty division. These results support our H3: only followers can outperform their 
less-informed counterparts, while leaders can not. Leaders appear less sensitive than 
followers of the fact that they received more biased cost data than their opponent, and 
therefore longer rely on them, which provides the opportunity for the better-informed 
follower to take advantage of  the leader (Bloomfield et al., 1999). 
As a side note, it is interesting to observe that followers were also able to gain higher 
profits when both players receive ABC (see duopoly oftype 4). Gal'Or (1985) indeed 
7 The market share of  the follower is equal to the profit of  the follower divided by the total market 
profit (=profit follower + profit leader) 
15 showed that in a scenario of  rational competitors, second movers (followers) earned 
higher profits then their first mover counterparts. A plausible explanation for this 
result is that rational play becomes more likely as both players have access to accurate 
cost data. 
Table 5:  Summary of  mean observations for each duopoly type (n=58) 
Panel A:  Summary statistics for the outperforming metrics 
Mean (profit F- profit L) 
Mean market share F 







a Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
b Significantly different from 0.5 at the 5% level 
Type 2 

















Panel B: Anova results for duopoly type and estimates for the different contrasts 
codes and their significance levels 
(profit F  - profit L)  market share F 
Source of  variation  F-value  F-value 
Duopoly type  3.93 **  3.41** 
Contrasting effectsC  Estimate  Estimate 
h>li  hil' 
Type 1 vs. 2 {.I I 00)  72711  0.0299 
Type 2 vs. 3  {O -110)  -46768**  -0.0183  ** 
Type 3 vs. 4 {OO-II)  29560  *  0.0104 
Interaction 12 vs. 34 (I-I -I 1)  43151 *  0.0195 * 
C Contrast codes can be found between brackets. Reported significance levels are 
based on a one sample t-test 
Significance: • p<.l 0 level; •• p <.05 level; • *. p < .01  level 
In panel B of  table 5, relative performance is compared among the four duopoly types. 
The duopoly type significantly explains the variance in both relative performance 
metrics. More interesting however are the contrast effects. First of  all H3 is again 
confirmed, since the contrast effect comparing the two asymmetric duopolies (Type 2 
vs. 3) is significant. A less-informed follower learns from a better-informed leader 
and performs as good as the leader (Type 3). On the other hand followers 
outperformed their rivals, when they receive the superior cost data (Type 2). 
16 In addition we also found additional support for the fact that more accurate cost 
became more redundant for followers when leaders were better informed (H2). When 
we compare the duopolies where the leader received biased cost information (type 1 
vs. 2) we can observe that cost system accuracy is highly important for followers. 
Followers significantly increased the profit difference against their leader by 72711 
and significantly improved their market share by 2.99% when ABC is received. When 
the leader had access to ABC (type 3 vs. 4), more accurate cost data was less 
important for followers since the gain in market share of 1.04% was not significant 
and the gain in profit performance against the leader of29560 was only marginally 
significant. The interaction effects of  43151 (which is the difference between 72711 
and 29560) for the profit difference and of 1.95% (=2.99%-1.04%) for the market 
share were significant at the 10% level. This seems to indicate that ABC is more (less) 
redundant for followers in terms of  outperforming when leaders receive accurate (less 
accurate) cost data, thereby reinforcing H2. 
4.3. Additional analyses 
Our results indicated that leaders have a strong tendency to rely on their own costing 
system. Even when their own costing system produced biased cost data, participants 
acting as leaders did not learn from better informed rivals. These results suggest that 
leaders neglect the information received from other market players. In the exit 
questionnaire several items checked whether participants in the leadership role where 
indeed more prone to the phenomenon of 'reference group neglect' (Camerer and 
Lovallo, 1999). Compared to followers, leaders found the price choices of  the 
competitor less important (F (1,108): 24.45; p<.Ol) and took to a lesser extent these 
price choices into account (F(J,108): 20.83; p<.Ol). Moreover, when evaluating the two 
sources against each other, participants acting as leaders evaluated their own cost 
information much more important than competitor feedback (F(J, 108): 20.82; p<.Ol). 
Leaders apparently attached a stronger value to their own actions since they consider 
their own realized profit performance more important for improving their price 
choices (F(I, 108): 3.09 p<.09). 
From these additional analyses, one can conclude that participants assigned to the 
leadership role were indeed more inclined to neglect the feedback received from other 
17 market players and mainly focus on the cost system. Followers however weighed this 
feedback against their own cost data. Cost system choice mattered less for profit 
improvement when they received feedback from a leader receiving ABC, while good 
cost system choice became more valuable for enhancing performance when their rival 
received biased cost data (see also section 4.1 and 4.2). 
5: Discussion 
This study provides experimental evidence concerning the value of  ABC in more 
competitive enviromnents. Prior experimental and theoretical work assumed ABC to 
be highly redundant in a competitive enviromnent, because decision makers tend 
incorporate informative feedback on other market players into their decisions. In a 
more adaptive competitive duopoly in which one player decides first, our results show 
that the learning from more informative market signals is less effective when one has 
to act first as a market leader. Participants in a leadership role exhibited a bias labeled 
"reference group neglect" which renders them more ignorant about feedback received 
from the competitor (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Leaders do not learn from superior 
competitors having access to accurate cost data when their own system produces 
biased cost figures. Since they prefer these biased cost figures for price setting over 
informative market feedback, they are outperformed by followers having access to 
more accurate cost data. In order to improve profits participants acting as leaders in a 
competitive setting have considerable interest in refming the accuracy of  their cost 
report. On the other hand, followers better weigh the feedback of  other market players 
against their own cost signals. When feedback is received from superior players with 
accurate cost data, followers utilize this feedback and cost system choice is less 
important. For followers cost accuracy does matter, however, when their rivals base 
their decisions on distorted cost figures. 
It  is important to note that in our experiment, leadership was induced by merely 
describing a 'barometric' leadership role to participants. Leadership was not related to 
advantages in the cost structure for one firm since both firms faced similar cost. Due 
to the mere feeling ofleadership reputation, participants acting as leaders relied 
heavily on their own (distorted) cost information for price setting and were more 
likely to neglect more informative market signals. Apparently the neglecting of 
18 competitors, which was more explicitly induced in prior research on market entry 
decisions (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), also occurs spontaneously in more natural 
leader-follower price setting scenario's. Further research is however needed to 
advance our understanding under which circumstances underutilization of such 
informative market feedback is more likely to occur. 
Our experiment investigated the dynamic interplay of cost information and market 
feedback in a competitive price setting duopoly consisting of  two market players. The 
question whether market leaders would continue to ignore informative market signals 
- and at the same time attach high value to their own cost system- when the nature of 
competition changes would be a fascinating area for future research. In extreme forms 
of  competition where price choices of  superior competitors would result in large 
losses for the less informed firm, it would be harder to avoid using feedback from 
superior market players. Altering the competition by changing the numbers of 
competitors (Krishnan, Luft and Shields, 2002) may also have an influence on value 
attached to accounting data with respect to other types of  feedback. 
However, market feedback is not the only source of  feedback managers receive in 
addition to cost information (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993, Malmi, 1997). They may 
hold and use firmly entrenched prior theories on customers and appropriate strategies, 
confirmed by casual observation of  competitors and customers, and potentially 
strengthened by contacts with other managers holding similar views. It is important to 
also ask ourselves whether these additional potential inputs in managerial decision 
making are always appropriately weighted against objective costing data.  Strong 
priors may lead to overconfidence in opinions, insensitivity to external information, 
insufficient search for the information most relevant to the decision, and rigidity in 
strategic action (Alba and Hutchinson, 2000). As managers often indicate to be 
satisfied with and to be confident about the cost figures their existing cost systems 
produce (Innes and Mitchell, 1995), they may not consider alternative sources of 
feedback even if  their accounting data are highly biased. 
As our data suggest, ABC does not always result in a competitive advantage for price 
setting. Followers quickly learned to mirror the superior price choices of  the better-
informed market leader when they themselves received biased cost data which made it 
19 difficult for the leader to gain a significant profit benefit.  However in competitive 
duopoly markets there are many other strategic considerations in which the accuracy 
of  cost information is important. The success of cost reduction initiatives such as 
changing the business process or the product-mix may vary with the quality of cost 
accounting data. The strategic changes in the way of doing business that firms can 
derive from the activity information in an ABC report could result in significant cost 
advantages, which may strongly strengthen the firm's market position. However, 
managers should always outweigh any benefit derived from accurate cost systems 
against potential implementation costs. Follow-up experiments could discover in 
which circumstances managers are more inclined to invest in costly cost system 
refinement to improve or assist their managerial decision making. In order to further 
understand the value of  cost accuracy in competitive markets, it is important that these 
future experiments maintain a focus on adaptive play and learning. 
20 APPENDIX A 
This appendix shows how total actual costs incurred are allocated to the two market 
segments using ABC or traditional volume based costing. We only display the report 
for the leader, since a report for the follower is similar. At the start of  the experiment, 
the leader's initial prices where € 1650 for market A and € 1710 for market B, while 
the follower responded with € 1645 for segment A and € 1706 for segment B. These 
prices were clearly not in line with the cost of serving (market A received a lower 
price while in fact it was more costly). Table Al displays the leader's actual results at 
these initial prices. While subjects also receive limited competitor feedback as 
displayed in the right hand sight of  table AI, they do not receive the actual cost 
figures. Instead imperfect cost reports are issued (see table A2 and A3). 
Table AI: Actual results for the leader and the feedback received from the competitor 
Actual results for the leader 
segment A  margin  segment B  margin  Total  margin 
Price  1650  1710 
Sales volume  2277  699  2976 
Revenue  3757463  1195803  4953266 
Actual cost  3547463  94.4%  904826  75.7 % 1144;$2289'  89.9% 
Profit  210000  5.6%  290977  24.3%  500977  10.1% 
Cost/unit  1557.8  1293.9 
Feedback competitor 
Price market A  1645 
Price market B  1706 
Total profit  500639 
We assume that part of  the total actual cost (4452289, see shaded area in Table AI) is 
in fact the cost of  goods sold. Products are imported at a fixed price where the import 
price for market B is slightly higher than that for market A: 
Cost of  goods sold (COS)  = 630 * Qa + 710 * Qb 
= 630 * 2277.25 + 710 * 699.3 = 1931171 
The remaining part of  total actual cost incurred (4452289 - 1931171 = 2521118), 
defined here as customer costs, is allocated to the two market segments using different 
cost accounting systems.  An ABC system uses a two-stage procedure to allocate this 
cost (see panel A of  table A2). In the first stage, costs are spread over three cost-to-
serve activities - ordering, delivery and software installation - on the basis of  the time 
21 that each activity consumes. In the second stage, the cost of each activity is allocated 
to the two segments based on activity drivers. Panel B of  table A2 displays the ABC 
cost report. Market A incurs per unit more cost since it requires more activities (more 
orders, deliveries and custom design) than market B. This corresponds with actual 
cost data where market A is also shown as more costly (see table Ai). 
Table A2: Underlying assumptions in the ABC condition and the ABC report 
Panel A:  assumptions of  the ABC system 
Stage 1: Allocating cost to activities 







Stage 2:  Activity drivers for each market segment 
Activity level per 100 units 
Segment A  Segment B 
No Orders  15  7 
No licenses  230  120 
No Deliveries  7  4 
Panel B: initial ABC report issued to participants acting as leader. 
Segment A  margin  Segment B  margin  Total  margin 
Sales Volume  2277  699  2977 
Price  1650  1710 
Revenues  3757463  1195803  4953266 
Cost of goods sold  1434668  38.2%  496503  41.5%  1931171  39.0% 
Customer Costs  2177171  57.9%  343947  28.8%  2521118  50.9% 
Drivervol.  Cost  Drivervol.  Cost  Drivervol.  Cost 
Order Processing  771790  20.5%  110601  9.2%  882391  17.8% 
Software installation  869189  23.1%  139258  11.6%  1008447  20.4% 
Delivery  536191  14.3%  94088  7.9%  630279  12.7% 
Profits  145624  3.9%  355353  29.7%  500977  10.1% 
Unit Costs  1586.1  1201.8 
Under traditional volume based costing (Table A3), customer costs are allocated to 
the two market segments using sales volume as a driver. Since this driver is unable to 
differentiate between the cost of  servicing the two market segments, subjects receive a 
highly biased cost picture on market segment level compared to actual cost. Market B 
is shown to be more costly then market A while in fact it incurs per unit less cost. 
Table A3: Initial traditional cost report issued to the participants acting as leader 
Segment A  margin  Segment B  margin  Total  Margin 
Sales Volume  2277  699  2977 
Price  1650  1710 
Revenues  3757463  1195803  4953266 
Cost of  goods sold  1434668  38.2%  496503  41.5%  1931171  39.0% 
Customer Costs  1928815  5l.3%  592302  49.5%  2521118  50.9% 
Profits  393980  10.5%  106998  8.9%  500977  10.1% 
Unit Costs  1477.0  1557.0 
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